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Response to stabilization: Phases III and IV
As indicated in the last chapter, the Stabilization Program had many com-
ponents, not all of which were effected in August 1958. The response of the
Turkish economy to the Stabilization Program is traced in this chapter. An
effort is made to analyze the separate effects of the various components of the
program and to evaluate its optimality on the basis of that response.
Three factors cloud the analysis. First, there were so many changes under-
taken simultaneously that it is difficult to sort out the effects of the separate
parts of the Stabilization Program. Second, detailed data, especially on quarter-
ly and monthly changes, are woefully lacking even for key variables. Third, the
political events of1959 to 1962 had strong economic repercussions and must
be taken into account in the analysis. It will be useful at the outset to provide
the reader with a brief chronology of the period. Thereafter the shifts in
monetary policy, fiscal policy, the trade regime and other variables are exam-
ined, along with their effects. Next, consideration is given to the relationship
of the Stabilization Program to the recession experienced by Turkey. Finally,
an effort is made to assess the degree to which the Program was optimal from
the viewpoint of Turkish economic growth.
I. Macroeconomic indicators
Figure 2 charts the course of the major macroeconomic variables over the
1959—1961 period, with indicators for the preceding and subsequent years
given to enable comparisons. As can be seen, the years 1959 to 1961 were a
time of extremely slow growth. The average annual growth of real GNP over
the three years was 2 per cent, less than tha rate of population growth.
Thereafter the growth rate rose sharply. The proximate cause of the slow
growth rate was recession, although the fact that agricultural output grew at
even less than its trend rate also contributed. The evidence suggests that there
were really two recessions. One started in 1958 and was largely the result of
tight money and thus of the Stabilization Program. It appears to have reached
a trough in the spring of 1959, after which economic activity began expand-
ing. By the spring of 1960 economic activity appears to have been fairly
buoyant with few signs of recession left. The second recession started in the
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Fig. 2. Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1950 to 1971.
Perhaps the most remarkable fact about the period 1959—1961 is that
after the spring of 1959 the Turkish price level remained stable through 1961.
Price increases, in fact, were relatively modest throughout the 1960's. Thus
the Stabilization Program was a complete success in breaking the inflationary
spiral that had existed in Turkey prior to the inauguration of the Program.
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This can be seen by the dramatic change in the course of the price level in
Fig. 2. Analysis of the factors that led to the change will be undertaken in
detail in Section II.
The government appears to have adhered fairly closely to most aspects of
the Stabilization Program until the summer of 1959. Thereafter the money
supply started to expand more rapidly than had been agreed to. By the winter
of 1960 it appeared that the government intended to resume its expansionist
policies, as a very expansionary budget was presented to Parliament.'
In May 1960 a bloodless revolution occurred when a group of military
leaders calling themselves the National Unity Committee (NUC) took over the
government. The causes of the revolution lay in discontent over both
political repression and economic policy.2 The NUC quickly reversed some
of the expansionist policies of the Menderes government and announced com-
plete adherence to the Stabilization Program. Thus in contrast to Cooper's
conclusion that devaluations increase the probability that politicians will lose
their jobs,3 in Turkey it was the failure of the government to adhere to the
Stabilization Program that contributed to its fall.
The flow of imports increased markedly after 1958. Premia on import
licenses and the active black market of the mid-1950's virtually disappeared.
Although exports and other foreign exchange receipts increased, the change
was not enough to compensate for the large rise in foreign exchange expendi-
tures. Among other charges made by the NUC against the Menderes govern-
ment was the fact that almost the entire foreign credit received in 1958 had
already been exhausted.4 Imports nonetheless continued increasing rapidly in
the first three years after the revolution and the foreign trade regime became
increasinglyliberal. Thus the period can be regarded as
Phase N.
II. Components of the Stabilization Program and their effects
Monetary and fiscal changes
As indicated above, the use of official prices (which were controlled by
law) in the construction of the price indices of the mid-1950's led to an
understatement of the true rate of inflation during that period. The average
1. Columbia School of Law, op. cit. (Note 14, Chap. I), p. 20.
2. Weiker, op. cit. (Note 13, Chap. I), Chapters 1 and 2.
3. Richard N. Cooper, "Currency Devaluation in Developing Countries," Essays in Inter.
national Finance No. 86, International Finance Section, Princeton University, June
1971, p. 30.
4. Weiker, op. cit. (Note 13, Chap. 1), p. 13.
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annual rate of increase in average wholesale prices from 1955 to 1958 was 19
per cent, even by official statistics, contrasting with an average annual rate of
1.5 per cent between final quarters from 1959 to 1962.
Four factors were primarily responsible for the change: (1) monetary poli-
cy, (2) the increased flow of imports, (3) the exchange-rate changes, and (4)
abandonment of the price control law and changes in SEE pricing policy.
Fiscal policy changes were of secondary importance. Brief consideration is
given in this section to fiscal policy and especially the fiscal impact of the
revenue generated by net receipts from the system of exchange taxes and
premia. Monetary policy changes are discussed thereafter.
Fiscal policy.Table IV-l presents data on central government expendi-
tures and receipts as a per cent of national income over the period 1957 to
1963. As pointed out in Chapter II, the government accounts do not include
the operations of the SEEs. Thus an incomplete picture of the impact of the
government sector on economic activity is provided. However, since the ef-
fect of SEE finances was primarily felt through money creation, the impact
of SEEs on governmental activity can be more appropriately considered when
evaluating monetary policy.
Inspection of the data in Table IV.l suggests that there was little change in
central government fiscal impact after 1958. The central government budget
was if anything somewhat expansionary. Expenditures rose from 14.5 per
cent of national income in 1958 to 18.1 per cent in 1961. Tax revenues also
rose, but their increase did not keep pace with that of expenditures, and net
government borrowing increased substantially in 1960. Thus both the in-










































Note:The government's assumption of the consolidated SEE debt is not included in
1961 central government borrowing.
Source:Same as Table 11-4.
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TableIV-2
Governmentnet revenues from foreign trade taxes, 1956 to 1962
1956 1957 19581959196019611962
Tax revenue (millions of TL)
Net foreign trade taxes 3997448731565150715531918
Totaltaxreceipts 2999382144305928609671877625
Net foreign trade taxes as percentage of:
Tax revenue 13.319.519.726.424721.625.2
Importsc.i.f. 35.066.999.0118.968.133.934.3
Sources: Tax data from Land, op.cit.(Table 1-5).
Import data from Statistical Yearbook, 1968, Pub. No. 580 (Ankara), 1969,
p. 309, State Institute of Statistics.
crease in government expenditures and its financing probably led to mild
expansionary pressures upon the Turkish economy.5
One interesting aspect of the Stabilization Program was the use of ex-
change taxes and premia. Their net effect was equivalent to that of imposing
export taxes. Since all purchases of foreign exchange were taxed TL 6.20 per
dollar while many sales of foreign exchange were accorded smaller premia,
the net receipts from the tax were sizeable, especially given the import sur-
plus. Table IV-2 gives the net revenue from foreign trade taxes and premia in
relation to total tax revenue and to imports for the period 1956 to 1962. As
can be seen, net revenue from foreign trade taxes increased almost five-fold
between 1956 and 1959. The large increase between 1956 and 1957 origi-
nated in the 40 per cent "Treasury Tax" imposed then on most imports.
Until 1958, export premia accounted for a relatively small drain on import
tax receipts, so that net tax receipts were just slightly less than gross receipts.
Export premia were sizeable from 1958 until 1960 and the difference be-
tween import taxes collected and export premia paid out became significant.
After August 1958 gross tax receipts on imports were more than two and one
half times imports (recorded at IL 2.80 per dollar), as the tax per IL 2.80 of
5.Asindicated above, part of theincreasein governmentexpenditures in1959was
attributableto the adjustment in salaries of government servants. For the government
as a whole (including social security institutions and local governments), wages and
salaries in relation to current expenditures on goodsandservices were as follows
(millions of U):
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Current expenditures 3226 4578 4762 5852 6231
Wages and salaries 1592 2424 2560 3276 3483
Per cent wage & salary 49.3 52.3 53.8 56.0 55.9
See Land, op. cit. (Table 1-5).
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imports c.i.f. was IL 6.20 and import duties were charged over and above
that. With an average premium on exports of about TL 2.70 and exports
much less than imports, net receipts from foreign trade taxes were greater
than the recorded TL value of imports in 1959. The export premia were
increased and the exchange rate was finally unified, so that by 1961 import
taxes were about the same fraction of imports as in 1956. But since the
exchange rate had increased so sharply foreign trade taxes generated about 25
per cent of total tax revenue in 1962, contrasting with only 13 per cent in
1956.
The net revenue from the tax-premium system in 1959 and 1960 was
therefore a significant element in keeping the government budget from being
even more expansionary than it was. Between 1958 and 1959, 46 per cent of
the increase in total tax revenues originated from the changes in net foreign-
trade tax receipts, and to some extent the 1958 figures already reflect the
incidence of the tax-premium system. While there would have been some
increase in foreign-trade tax receipts resulting from the increased flow of
imports in 1959, the incremental revenues resulting from the tax-premium
system, amounting to 1.6 per cent of 1959 national income, were undoubted-
ly an anti-inflationary factor of significance.
Monetary policy.Whereas fiscal policy was mildly expansionary in the
years 1958 to 1960, monetary policy was extremely tight from August 1958
to mid-1959. It will be recalled that one component of the Stabilization
Program was the ceilings imposed on Central Bank and commercial bank
credit.
Table W-3 gives data on the money supply at the end of each quarter as
reported by the EIU. The money supply had increased by more than 10 per
cent between March and September 1958, with virtually the entire increase
coming in the period before August. The money supply then actually con-
tracted about 5 per cent from September to December, with a further 1 per
cent decline in the first quarter of 1959.6 The shift from rapid monetary
expansion to monetary contraction was therefore abrupt. After the second
quarter of 1959 rapid expansion of the money supply resumed, with an
increase of over 16 per cent in the last six months of 1959. After the NUC
assumed power in May 1960 the money supply remained virtually stable until
the middle of 1961. Thus two distinct tight-money periods can be distin-
guished: the first lasted from. August 1958 until mid-1959; the second started
in the second quarter of 1960 and continued well into 1961.
6. The data given in Table IV-3 are based on EIU reports. The OEEC reported a 2 per
cent drop in the money supply between June and October 1958 but did not present
data for later periods. OEEC, Turkey, 1959, op. cit. (Note 32, Chap. 1), p. 23.
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Table IV-3
Money supply, quarterly, 1957 to 1962
(billions of TL —atthe end of each period indicated)
Year
Quarter
I H III IV
1957 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.5
1958 5.6 6.0 6.2 5.9/9.0
1959 8.9 9.0 9.4 10.5
1960 10.8 10.6 10.8 10.9
1961 10.8 10.7 10.9 11.7
1962 11.7 11.6 12.3 13.0
Notes:a) The EIU changed series at the end of 1958, so that figures are not com-
parable between periods. Until 1958, only currency and demand deposits were
included. Thereafter, currency and all commercial bank deposits are included.
The figure before the slash for the fourth quarter of 1958 is comparable with
earlier data. The TL 9.0 figure is comparable with figures for later quarters.
b) The data are not comparable with those given by the Central Bank or with
those given in International Financial Statistics. However, issues of the Central
Bank'sMonthly Bulletin for the period 1958 to 1962 were not available to the
author, and International Financial Statistics does not report quarterly data on
the Turkish money supply until the second quarter of 1959.
Source:EIU, op. cit. (Note I, Chap. II), Nos. 28, 32, 35, 39, 40, 43, and 47.
There is ample evidence that the sharp shift in mid-1958 from rapid mone-
tary expansion to a stable money supply had immediate effects on the
Turkish economy. As reported by the EIU,
The authorities certainly appear to be determined ...tomaintain the credit squeeze,
but the latter, both by stifling demand and making it more difficult to fmance
essential imports, is undoubtedly hitting industry hard; many factories, particularly
in the textile field, have closed down or are working part-time ...Atpresent, the
import market is finding credit stringency a less serious handicap than axe manufac-
turers and exporters ...Itis already clear that certain of the smaller manufacturing
concerns set up speculatively during the import famine of recent years will have to
close down permanently. In the end, ...somecredit relaxation would appear inevita-
ble; failing this, the continuing slump in demand would nullify the effects of any
increase in output arising from a more liberal import policy.7
Detailed examination of the effects of tight monetary policy will be under-
taken in Section III, below. The important points for present purposes are
that: (1) the shift in monetary policy was large and abrupt; (2) the tight
money policy was abandoned in the second half of 1959;and (3) tight money
was resumed in the summer of 1960. One question of importance for under-
7. EIU, op. cit. (Note 1, Chap. II), No. 31, August 1959, p. 10.
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standing the timing of the response to the Stabilization Program is what led
to the abrupt resumption of monetary expansion and the inflationary budget
__________________
of1960.
Two interpretations are possible. One is that the Menderes government
never seriously intended to carry through the Stabilization Program. The
other is that the credit stringency and other effects of tight money and the
Stabilization Program were sufficiently pronounced to lead the government
to abandon the program as politically unpalatable and/or economically un-
desirable. Okyar and Iren8 take the former view, while Aktan takes the
latter.9 Which interpretation is correct is closely related to the question raised
in Chapter III: whether the government accepted the Stabilization Program
because that was a necessary price for obtaining foreign credits or, alternative-
ly, whether it believed that its past policies were in general need of reform. A
definitive judgment is impossible in the absence of direct evidence. On either
interpretation, however, it is likely that the visible effects of extremely tight
money must have made the abandonment of the Program more appealing and
perhaps speeded the time at which rapid monetary expansion resumed. We
shall return to this question below when evaluating the optimality of the
Stabilization Program.
SEE finances and their effects.In August 1958 the prices of many SEE
products were raised. However, the initial increase proved to be inadequate to
enable the SEEs to cover their expenses, and a second large round of price
increases took place in May 1959."'
In view of the important role of the SEE deficits in contributing to the
money supply increases prior to August 1958, raising SEE prices was essential
if rapid expansion of the money supply was to be halted. After 1959 SEE
deficits never again became a major drain on Central Bank credits, although
financing their investment programs remained something of an issue. As such,
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10. Columbia School of Law, op. cit. (Note 14, Chap. I),p. 25.
11. There is one interesting sidelight on the period which may be indicative of govern-
ment intentions. After the Stabilization Program was in effect, the SEEs were still in
financial difficulties. The government responded initially by failing to charge the TL
6.20 tax on their imports, and the SEEs did not pay the government tax liabilities
they incurred. These practices stopped only after the IMF protested. See Columbia
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Theinflow of imports
Table P/-4 gives quarterly export and import figures for the years 1957 to
1960. The export response to the Stabilization Program will be evaluated in
more detail below. Itis sufficient for present purposes to note that the
increase in exports in the first half of 1959 was attributable to delays in
exporting the 1958 crop and to some reductions in inventory following the
Stabilization Program. It will be recalled that new export regulations were not
promulgated immediately in August 1958 and that there was therefore a
delay before exporting at the new exchange rates could begin. Until the final
quarter of 1959 the increase in exports was thus achieved primarily through
reductions in inventory rather than through increases in production.
In the absence of estimates of inventory investment, the increased flow
of imports which really began in the first quarter of 1959 should therefore be
regarded as a net deflationary factor.t2 Thus for the first three quarters of
1959 the increase in imports was $73.7 million. In the final quarter of 1959
the increase in the net inflow (imports minus exports) was $38.4 million. The
deflationary effect of the import flow can be placed at $112 million for 1959
as a whole. Converted at the IL 9 per dollar exchange rate, that represented
2.4 per cent of 1959 national income and 3 per cent of 1958 national in-
come. Thus the increased net inflow of imports, allowing for the part of
12. Of course part of the recorded increase in imports may reflect an increase in the
fraction of unports entering legally or a reduction in under.invoicing. The data in
Table 11-9 suggest that that was not a significant factor until 1961, however.
Table IV-4




I II III IV
Exports f.o.b.
1957 90.4 94.6 62.4 97.7 345.2
1958 81.5 50.5 38.6 76.6 247.2
1959 103.4 81.3 49.6 119.5 353.8
1960 98.6 59.0 54.4 108.7 320.7
Imports c. i.f.
1957 90.5 98.2 101.4 107.0 397.1
1958 86.0 100.8 58.9 69.3 315.1
1959 98.4 105.9 115.1 150.6 469.9
1960 115.9 115.6 129.6 107.3 468.1
Source:InternationalFinancial Statistics, 1967/68 Supplement.t figures for the years 1957 to
Program will be evaluated in
t purposes to note that the
was attributable to delays in
ns in inventory following the
wexportregulations were not
that there was therefore a
es could begin. Until the final
is achieved primarily through
eases in production.
vestment, the increased flow
of 1959 should therefore be
the first three quarters of
In the final quarter of 1959
ports) was $38.4 million. The
ced at $112 million for 1959
change rate, that represented
er cent of 1958 national in-
ts, allowing for the part of
s may reflect an increase in the
inunder-invoicing.The data in
or until 1961, however.














to Stabilization: Phases III and IV
I
The Devaluation-Cu rn-Liberalization Episode 95
exports originating from inventory disinvestment, constituted a sizeable defla-
tionary factor.
Net effect on prices
Table IV-5 presents quarterly wholesale and home-goods price indices for
the period 1958 to 1962. Data for home-goods prices in 1958 are unfortu-
nately not available on a quarterly basis. It seems clear, however, that both
wholesale prices and home-goods prices rose at least until the first quarter of
1959. Some of that rise, of course, resulted from the first increase in SEE
prices, and part of it may have been the result of recording procedures.1
3The
home-goods price index shows prices falling somewhat after the first quarter
of 1959, while the wholesale price index shows increases, albeit at a far
slower rate than in earlier periods. On either index, however, it is evident that
inflation had ceased by early 1959. The annual figures therefore obscure a
great deal about the timing of price changes.
13. As indicated above, the government recorded official prices in the price indices
during the inflation years. Thus when prirns were decontrolled the prices actually
recorded rose more than market prices. See OEEC, Turkey, 1961, op. cit. (Note 42,
Chap. III), pp. 11—12.
Table tV-S




I II III IV
Wholesale prices
1958 90 95 104 111 100
1959 116 119 120 124 120
1960 129 128 123 125 126
1961 129 129 129 132 130
1962 140 139 133 137 137
Home-goods prices
1958 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100
1959 129 118 117 119 119
1960 122 121 114 116 117
1961 119 117 118 121 119
1962 125 124 122 127 125
Note:There is a discrepancy between the annual figures and the average of the
quarterly figures for the 1959 home-goods price index. The reason for the
difference is not known.
Source:Same as Table I-S.The Devaluation-Cu rn-Liberal izat
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Both indices indicate a return to moderate price increases in the final
quarter of 1959 and the first quarter of 1960, after which prices declined for
the remainder of the year and remained highly stable until the final quarter of
1961. Thus, contrasted with an annual average rate of inflation of over 15 per
cent between 1956 and the first half of 1958, prices were either stable or rose
only a few per cent annually between 1959 and 1961, even without allowing
for bias in the statistics.
To estimate the factors contributing to the change, the same methodology
is used as was employed in Chapter II with regard to the inflation of the
mid-l950's. The results are reported in Table IV-6.
It is of interest that the predicted rate of price increase for 1959 to 1961
almost equals the actual price increase. But whereas the simple model devel-
oped in Chapter II predicts a very low rate of inflation in 1959 followed by
rates of 10.6 and 8.4 per cent in 1960 and 1961, the actual rate of price
increase was 19 per cent in 1959, negative in 1960, and only 1 .7 per cent in
1961.
The difference between predicted and actual timing may have resulted
from several factors. As already seen, part of the increase in prices in 1959
was attributable to the "catch-up" in SEE prices, which was a necessary
condition for the cessation of additional inflation and which can to a large
Table IV-6
Predicted and actual inflation, 1959 to 1962













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1959 0.0 3.0 3.0 6.0 6.9 0.9 19.0
1960 0.6 3.0 —0.2 3.4 14.0 10.6 —1.7
1961 —1.1 3.0 0.6 2.5 10.9 8.4 1.7
1962 2.6 3.0 2.6 8.2 7.6 —0.6 5.0
Sources: Given in Table 11-7, except for imports, which had to be adjusted because of
the exchange-rate change. The 1961 IL value of imports was linked to national
income in 1961 prices. TL values for 1960 and 1962 were then computed by
multiplying the 1961 figure by the ratio of the other year's dollar value of im-
ports to the 1961 dollar value of imports. The same linkage procedure was
followed for earlier years, except that the 1961 TL value of imports was multi-
plied by the ratio of 1961 national income at 1948 prices to 1961 national
income at 1961 prices to obtain a base figure.to Stabilization: PhasesIII and iv The Devaluation-Cu rn-Liberalization Episode 97
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Computed 1959 excess demand was virtually zero.Compared with com-
puted excess demands of 21.3, 21.5, and 12.5 per centin the preceding three
years, the magnitude of theshift was truly remarkable and attests to the
severity of the Stabilization Program. If time isrequired before altered under-
lying conditions are reflected in changedexpectations, the virtual price sta-
bility of 1960—1961 may have resulted from adownward shift in expecta-
tions, which offset excess demand fromother sources.
Another feature to be noted is that agriculturalproduction, according to
SIS national income estimates, contributedvirtually nothing to whatever ad-
justments occurred following devaluation.Although the 1958 crop was per-
haps good,1
4thedisagreement over the size of the crop rendersanalysis
difficult. After 1958 all sources appear to be in agreementthat increases in
agricultural production were relatively small. Thus itcannot be concluded
that fortuitous weather conditions were a factorin bringing inflation to a
halt. From 1959 to 1961, on the contrary,agricultural production contrib-
uted little to growth in aggregate supply.
It should also be noted that the estimates inTable IV.6 contain the im-
plicit assumption that the growth of non-agriculturalcapacity was invariant
with respect to the devaluation and stabilization. Notonly is that a question-
able assumption, but it will be seen below thatthere is evidence that it is
wrong. On balance, however, itis doubtful if the short-term shifts in supply
were sufficient to render the ordersof magnitude given in Table IV-6 inappro-
priate.
The evidence then is mixed. Certainly in 1959the influx of imports con-
stituted a major anti-inflationary factor. The increased revenuefrom foreign
trade taxes also undoubtedly absorbed a significant amountof purchasing
power previously accruing to importers.These factors, as well as any improve-
ment in resource allocation and increaseirscapacity utilization, led to
stronger anti-inflationary pressures than wouldhave taken place from mone-
tary shifts alone. Without the shift in monetarypolicy, however, inflation
would have been temporarily retarded but certainlycould not have been
stopped. Thus primary responsibility for stopping inflation must goto the
shift in monetary policy; other components of the StabilizationProgram
enhanced the impact of the monetary shift.
14. There is dispute over the 1958 crop. This dispute lies at thebasis of the divergence
between SIS and SPO national income data. SIS estimates ofnational income at
1948 prices imply a 17.7 per cent increase in agricultural productionbetween 1957
and 1958 with no increase between 1958 and 1959. SPO estimatesimply no increase
between 1957 and 1958 and a 6 per cent increase inagricultural output between
1958 and 1959. In recent years a consensus has begun emerging to theeffect that the
tiuth lies somewhere between the two estimates.98 Response to Stabilization. Phases II! and IV
The role of exchange-rate changes
It has already been seen that the most remarkable result of the Stabiliza-
tion Program was Turkey's transformation from a rapid-inflation country to
one with virtual price stability. A natural question is the role of the EER
changes in the Stabilization Program. While the increased flow of imports
helped in the transformation, it was Turkey's receipt of foreign credits rather
than exchange-rate policy which was the primary factor enabling additional
imports. To the extent that imports entered at a higher EER not fully offset
by increased government payments of export premia, some purchasing power
was absorbed which contributed to the shift to price stability.
The questions therefore arise as to whether: the EER changes had any
effects separate from those of the other components of the Stabilization
Program and whether the EER changes can be viewed as separate from the
Stabilization Program aside from their revenue-generating effects which, in
any event, came at least as much from the import surplus as from the differ-
ential EERs between imports and exports.
The first question has three separate parts: (1) the behavior of exports
after August 1958; (2) the behavior of other components of the balance of
payments; and (3) the resource-allocational effects of EER changes. The re-
source-allocational effects of EER changes are considered in Section III, since
they were closely interrelated with the overall determinants of the level of
economic activity, It should be noted at this juncture that the primary re-
source-allocational effects of the EER changes were not immediately felt, and
can be better considered as part of a longer-run response to devaluation.'
Export behavior.Although exports increased between 1958 and 1959,
their expansion was by no means dramatic. A number of factors obscure
analysis of reasons for the increase that did occur. First, it has already been
seen that export statistics prior to August 1958 were difficult to interpret,
reflecting "switch" deals, bilateral debt repayment arrangements and asso-
ciated artificially high prices for exports, and perhaps some faking of invoices
as well as unrecorded export transactions. Second, many of the export trans-
actions undertaken in 1957 and 1958 were carried out by government and
quasi-government agencies, often at a loss. Since those transactions were
somewhat less closely tied to profitability than were exports undertaken by
private traders, one would not necessarily expect the same sort of response as
if the profit motive had dominated all exports. Third, as was seen in Chap-
ter III, the export EERs were not fully unified in August 1958, and export
premia increased for different commodities at various dates from August
1958 to 1960.
15. See Chapter VII, below.
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With these factors in mind, we can examine data on the quarterly behavior
of exports given in Table IV-7. The first column gives quarterly exports sea-
sonally adjusted at annual rates for the period 1957 to 1960. The second
column gives the quarterly figures for exports of traditional commodities.
With the exception of cotton, those commodities did not receive the TL 9
rate until various dates in 1959 and 1960. Many commodities were exported
primarily by government agencies. The third column gives the behavior of
other "minor" exports, all of which were accorded a TL 6.20 premium in
August 1958 and were predominantly the domain of private traders.
Inspection of the second and third columns of Table IV-7 indicates that
Table IV.7

















































































Notes:a) Seasonal adjustment factors were computed for the period 1948 to 1970.
The year was taken from the second quarter of one calendar year to the first
quarter of the next, since the crop export season overlaps the calendar year.
b) Major exports are: chrome, cotton, hazelnuts, raisins, tobacco and wheat.
Minor exports are the difference between total and major exports.
c) Actual quarterly export totals are the sum of major and minor exports and
are given,in Table IV-4.
Source: Data from International Financial Statistics, various issues.100 Responseto Stabilization: Phases III and IV
there were significant differences in the behavior of major and minor exports
following August 1958. The exportation of major commodities appears to
have been delayed somewhat until new export regulations were issued, so that
the third quarter 1958 exports were less than they would otherwise have been
and the subsequent three quarters' totals were perhaps slightly higher. Ex-
ports of major commodities were still 11 per cent below their 1957 level in
1959. Although they rose 28 per cent over 1958, that was primarily attributa-
ble to the spillover in exports from calendar year 1958 to calendar 1959,as
exporters awaited higher premia on traditional exports.t 6Inall, the response
of traditional exports to the changed EERs was very moderate and generally
disappointing. It will be seen in Chapter VII that a major reason for this is
that price signals from the international market are generally not reflected to
producers in Turkey, so that the quantity of exports depends much more
upon government policy than upon EERs themselves.
In contrast to major exports, minor exports had declined much more
sharply during the mid-l950's and were $77.8 million in 1957 compared to
$116 million in 1953. The striking feature is the shrinkage in minor exports
in the first half of 1958. Although the decline was steady from 1953 on,
much of the drop in the first half of 1958 may have represented speculative
inventory accumulation in anticipation of devaluation.'This is the more
plausible because it seems unlikely that any production response to the al-
tered EERs could have been felt by the end of the third quarter of 1958 and
little could have occurred by the end of the year.
Even if the change in minor exports between the first and second halves of
1958 was entirely attributable to offsetting inventory changes, it is note-
worthy that the flow of minor exports increased in each subsequent year.
Minor exports in 1959 were $109 million, compared to $80 million in 1957.
They had thus virtually reattained their 1953 level. By 1960, minor exports
were $133 million. Thus minor exports seem to have responded to the altered
EERs. Although the relative response appears impressive, the minor exports
were too small a component of total exports to have a sizeable effect on total
export earnings.
It will be seen in Chapter VII that there is ample evidence of the respon-
siveness of most minor and some traditional exports to changed real EERs.
But in the short-run period from August 1958 to 1961 the export response
was not pronounced.
16. Mustafa Renksizbulut, "Analysis of Turkey's Foreign Trade and Some Estimates
about Future Developments," Turkish Economic Review, May 1962, p. 21.
17. There is little, If anything, in contemporary comments to suggest that devaluation
appeared any more likely in 1958 than in earlier years until at [east the second
quarter. Thus although the data are strongly suggestive of speculative activity, there
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Capitalflows.When there are expectations of exchange-rate changes,peo-
pie attempt to hold the currencies they expect may appreciate. One effect of
changes in EERs is that funds previously held in other currencies may be
repatriated. Although such repatriation represents a once-and-for-all increase in
foreign exchange receipts, it can potentially be used to finance some liberaliza-
tion of imports. It is of interest to attempt to estimate the magnitude of the
speculative flow in Turkey.
As indicated in Chapter II, the reliability of the balance-of-payments statis-
tics in the 1950's left much to be desired. Official data can therefore provide
only a rough approximation as to the size of the speculative flow and must be
interpreted with care.
Recorded net private capital outflows were $29 million in 1956 and $61
million in 1957. By contrast, inflows of $73 million were recorded in 1958
and an additional $39 million is reported for the next two years (see Ta-
ble 1-6, above). It is probable that most of the 1958-to-1960 private capital
inflow reflected the return of speculative funds. Since there were probably
net capital outflows in the first eight months of 1958, the capital inflow over
the last four months was very likely larger than $73 million, but there are no
quarterly data available. Even accepting the $73 million estimate would indi-
cate a reversal of $131 million between 1957 and 1958 in private capital
flows, all of which represented a net improvement in the balance of pay-
ments.
Errors and omissions in the official balance-of-payments statistics con-
tinued to be negative until the end of 1959, although the largest negative
figure (minus $97 million) was recorded in 1957. Although negative errors
and omissions in 1958 might have been the outcome of a neg4tive balance on
unrecorded capital flows for the fIrst eight months and a positive balance for
the last four months, the fact that errors and omissions were still negative in
1959 suggests that something more systematic was wrong. Given the unrelia-
bility of the data, it is difficult to reach any firm conclusions, but it seems
inadvisable to count the change in errors and omissions as part of the specula-
tive reversal following devaluation.
Expectations.With the frequent changes in exchange taxes and export
premia in the mid-1950's, it would be surprising had the August 1958 changes
removed all expectations of future increases in EERs. There is some evidence
that supports the hypothesis that many persons indeed anticipated further
exchange-rate adjustments. Uncertainty about future premia probably lasted
until de jure devaluation in 1960. Thus the EIU reported in early 1959 that:
In recent weeks, there have been many rumours in Turkish business circles that with
the second global import quota, the premium rate for imports, now TL 9.02 =$1,
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wouldbe adjustedto an average TL 12 =$1,with separate rates for specific catego-
ries of goods..." 18
Thisuncertainty may account in part for the fact noted in Chapter III that
initial applications for import licenses under the First Import Program to-
taled almost four times the amount allocated for that period. On the export
side, it was reported that exporters continued holding stocks of some com-
modities in anticipation of further changes in the export premia.
One indicator of expectations about future exchange rates is the price of
gold. The price of gold coin, fairly symptomatic of the gold market's be-
havior, reached a peak of TL 128 per gram in 1958, a level not reattained
until the late 1960's. Although expectations of future changes may have
persisted, the disparity between prevailing and expected future exchange rates
fell after 1958.
Interaction between exchange-rate changes and stabilization.Given the
relatively limited short-term response of foreign-exchange receipts to changes
in export EERs, itis apparent that the primary impact of the Stabilization
Program, at least initially, was the cessation of inflation. An interesting ques-
tion, therefore,is whether inflation could have been equally effectively
stopped had the Stabilization Program not contained provisions for EER
changes.
Two separate factors must be considered. First, the large inflow of imports
was a sizeable deflationary factor and would have been considerably less so
had the 1957 import EERs remained in effect. Second, there is the considera-
tion that exports would almost certainly have stagnated, if not declined fur-
ther, had export EERs not been altered.
It seems incontrovertible that a sizeable increase in imports was a neces-
sary precondition for substantially halting Turkey's inflation. Those imports
were financed primarily by foreign credits and therefore could have taken
place at the old EERs (had the creditor countries not insisted upon EER
changes as a precondition for receipt of the foreign credits). Had imports
increased at 1957 nominal import EERs, a much smaller fraction of the
premium on import licenses would have been absorbed by the government. It
has already been seen that the net revenues (which were less than the increase
in payments for imports by reason of the increased premium payments to
exports) from foreign trade taxes in 1959 were 2.4 per cent of national
income, and that the additional domestic purchasing power absorbed by the
altered import EERs was at least twice that amount.
The effects of tight money would have been substantially reduced had
18. EIU, op. cit. (Note 1, Chap. II), No. 29, February 1959, p. 5.
19. Ibid., No. 28, November1958, p.3. The years 1959 to 1962
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importEERs not been increased. While a contraction of the money supply of
sufficient magnitude to reduce demand for imports via deflation might have
similarly reduced the premium, the adverse consequences of a contraction of
that magnitude would almost certainly have been unacceptable. In the con-
text of inflationary expectations which existed in mid-1958, it seems reason-
able to conclude that given the shift in monetary policy which actually oc-
curred, failure to increase import EERs would have impaired if not eliminated
Turkey's chances of transition from a high-inflation to a moderate-inflation
country. Thus increases in import EERs were in this author's judgment an
integral and necessary part of the program to achieve price stability, in that
the economic costs of increasing import EERs were far less than would have
been the costs of reducing the money supply by enough to absorb the pre-
mium on imports at the old EERs.
On the export side, it is not as obvious that altered EERs contributed
significantly to reduction in the rate of inflation in the first several years after
August 1958. First, there is the fact that the short-term export response was
disappointing. Second, there is the obvious consideration that if Turkey (or
any other country) could obtain imports without exports, it would be defla-
tionary. Thus if Turkey from 1958 on could have had her actual level of
imports with her 1958 level of exports, the net effect would have been
deflationary as contrasted with the actual course of events. However, Turkey
would have been unable to borrow more without increasing export EERs, as
other countries were not willing to finance an import surplus of the implied
size. Export-EER alterations were thought necessary to restore prospects of
eventual export growth. Even if Turkey had received an initial foreign credit
enabling the increase in imports, it would have been a once-and-for.all in.
crease. The import flow would have had to be reduced once the initial credit
was exhausted, with attendant inflationary pressures at that time.
Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that: (1) the increased flow of im.
ports was an important factor in enabling the achievement of price stability;
(2) altering import EERs, by absorbing domestic purchasing power, was at
least as important a deflationary factor as the increased flow of imports; (3)
since the imports were financed by foreign credits, altered export EERs were
not essential to the attainment of price stability in the short run; but (4)
alteration of export EERs was essential if the flow of imports was to be
maintained over an extended period of time, which was necessary for con-
tinuation of price stability over the longer run.
to Stabilization. Phases III and IV
separate rates for specific catego-
fact noted in Chapter III that
he First Import Program to.
that period. On the export
holding stocks of some corn
e export premia.'
exchange rates is the price of
itic of the gold market's be-
i1958,a level not reattained
of future changes may have
cpected future exchange rates
stabilization.Given the
exchange receipts to changes
impact of the Stabilization
riflation. An interesting ques-
ye been equally effectively
ntained provisions for EER
t, the large inflow of imports
ye been considerably less so
there is the considera-
agnated, if not declined fur-
ease in imports was a neces-
y's inflation. Those imports
therefore could have taken
ies not insisted upon EER
reign credits). Had imports
ch smaller fraction of the
rbed by the government. It
were less than the increase
ased premium payments to
e 2.4 per cent of national
ing power absorbed by the
Substantially reduced had
III. The Stabilization Program and the level of economic activity
The years 1959 to 1962 were slow-growth years for the Turkish economy,104 Responseto Stabilization: Phases III and IV The Devaluation-Cu m-Liberaljzat,oJ
and there is little doubt that recession was experienced over much of the
period. In this section, the magnitude, timing and determinants of the level of
economic activity over the period are examined.
The magnitude and timing of the recession
Data are woefully lacking for an adequate evaluation of the degree and
timing of changes in the level of economic activity over the 1959-to-1962
period. Such data as are available suggest that the rate of growth leveled off in
the first six to nine months after the August 1958 devaluation, and then E
increased rapidly. That was followed, however, by a sharp decline in the level
of economic activity in the last half of 1960 and most of 1961.
The SIS estimates of national income at constant prices suggest overall
growth rates of 3.8, 2.4, zero, and 6.4 per cent, respectively, for the years
1959 to 1962,20withincome originating in manufacturing remaining con-
stant over the three years 1959 to 1961. As indicated above, one factor
accounting for the relatively slow growth rate over the period was undoubted-
ly the lackluster performance of the agricultural sector, from which income
originating at constant prices actually declined.
Thereare few if any valid indicators of changes in the level of economic
activity between quarters. Data on quarterly electric power and cement pro-
duction reported by the EIU are given in Table IV-8 and mdicate a slackening
in the growth rate of power production and sharp fluctuations in cement
production. The right-hand side of the Table gives the percentage change
from the same quarter in the previous year. The power production data
suggest that the two middle quarters of 1959 and the four quarters starting
with the third quarter of 1960 were the periods of most pronounced slacken-
ing in growth, and also that the slackening was both longer and more pro-
0' nouncedin 1960—1961than m 1959.
Thefigures of cement production show rather more marked changes. For
cement, an import-substitute during the 1950's, production fell somewhat
after the third quarter of 1958, rose rapidly from mid-1959 to mid-1960, and
thereafter declined once again. The 1960—1961 decline is both steeper and of
longer duration. Insofar as cement and power production can be taken as
indicators of short-term changes in the level of economic activity, these data
would suggest that the 1960—1961 recession was far more pronounced than
that of 1959.
Annual production data tend to confirm this impression. As seen in Chap-
ter I, real national income is estimated to have declined in 1961. Residential
construction declined in 1959 and did not reattain its 1958 level until 1962.
20. See Table 1-3, above.¶
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C-ICOther construction declined continuously from 1958 to 1961 and was well
below its 1958 level in 1962. The textile industry apparently was also stag-
nant over the four-year period. Other industries generally show an increase in
output in 1959, with stagnation or decline between 1960 and 1961.21 The
OECD interpretation was
Manufacturing production was practically stagnant in 1958 but, under the impetus of
renewed imports of raw materials and spare parts, made possible by the credits
received in the framework of the 1958 Stabilization Programme, output rose by
nearly 5 per cent in 1959. In 1960, the events leading up to, and immediately
following, the revolution in May 1960 led to some hesitation on the part of pro-
ducers and consumers which had a depressing effect on economic activity.22
It seems a reasonable conclusion that there were two separate recessions in
Turkey. The first started with the devaluation and reached its nadir in the
second quarter of 1959. Thereafter economic expansion resumed, especially
in the last half of 1959 and the fIrst few months of 1960. The second
recession began in the summer of 1960, and reached its trough late in 1961.
Since there was probably some slack in the economy in early 1960, the
second recession was undoubtedly the more severe of the two, reflecting both
a bigger downswing and a lower level of economic activity at the start of the
decline. The greater magnitude of the downswing is evidenced both by the
sharper and more widespread declines in production in different sectors of
the economy and by the national income estimates for the period. The ab-
sence of quarterly data of course renders more precise measurement irnpos-
sible.
Factors contributing to recession
Causes of the 1958—1959 slowdown. In the absence of data upon which
more scientific tests could be based, any interpretation of the determinants of
the level of economic activity within Turkey over the 1958.10-1962 period
must of necessity be based on personal judgement. The 1958—1959 recession
will be first considered.
It has already been seen (Table IV-3, above) that the shift in monetary
policy was sharp and abrupt. Given its magnitude, the surprising thing is not
that there was a recession but rather how mild the recession appears to have
been. In this author's judgment the shift in monetary policy was responsible
for the recession that did occur, and had it not been for some mitigating
circumstances the monetary shift would have led to a deeper recession than
was in fact realized. The increase in economic activity late in 1959 was
21. OECD, Turkey,1963, p.58; and OECD, Turkey,1961, op. cit.(Note 42, Chap. 111),
p. 23.Data from OECD, Turkey,h
22.Ibid.
106 Response to Stabilization. Phases III and IV
I
The Devaluation Cu rn-Liberal
attributable primarily to the
resulting change in expectatiol
This view is consistent
income relationship and als
activity. The really significa
Again, no quantitative an
doubtedly contributed. Firs
reduction in investment (as r
offset by changes in govern
ports prior to the second q
some extent. In particular, a
1960 suggests that replace
relatively high. This demand
private investment which wo
of capital goods required co
investment, the influx of im
would otherwise have been
Some observers have sugg
tributing to the mildness of
price flexibility in Turkey
difficult argument to assess.
forbade strikes. However, th
wages with which to evalua
price index which are avail
period, eleven declined at 1
two-year interval,23 which
Causes of the 1960—196
factors contributing to the
As shown above, the availab
sion was substantially more
Yet as seen in Table IV-6 tlt
demand shows that there v
economy in 1960 and 1961!
Contemporary accounts 2
the May 1960 Revolution.
larly blamed for much of thi
The economy at the inomefl
be both slow and painful.
peasants are simply tefrainue to Stabilization: Phases III and IV The Devaluation Cum-Liberalization Episode 107
m 1958 to 1961 and was well
istry apparently wasalSostag-
s generally show an increase in
tween 1960 and 1961.21 The
in 1958 but, under the impetus cf
trts, made possible by the credits
ation Programme, output rose by
a leading up to, and immediately
me hesitation on the part of pro-
ton economic activity.22
rere two separate recessions in
and reached its nadir in the
expansion resumed, especially
of 1960. The second
its trough late in 1961.
economy in early 1960, the
of the two, reflecting both
activity at the start of the
king is evidenced both by the
in different sectors of
for the period. The ab-
precise measurement impos-
absence of data upon which
ation of the determinants of
er the l958-to-l962 period
t. The 1958—1959 recession
that the shift inmonetary
the surprising thing isnot
e recession appears to have
tary policy was responsible
been for some mitigating
to a deeper recessionthan
activity late in 1959was
1, op. cit. (Note 42,Chap. III),
attributable primarily to the abandonment of monetary stringency and the
resulting change in expectations.
This view is consistent with Fry's estimates of the money supply-money
income relationship and also with the apparent slowdown in construction
activity. The really significant question is why the recession was so mild.
Again, no quantitative answer can be given although several factors un-
doubtedly contributed. First, fiscal policy was expansionary: part of the
reduction in investment (as reflected in the construction data) was probably
offset by changes in government expenditures. Second, the shortage of im-
ports prior to the second quarter of 1959 had retarded economic activity to
some extent. In particular, a large influx of capital goods imports in 1959 and
1960 suggests that replacement demand for capital goods may have been
relatively high. This demand probably offset part of the downward shift in
private investment which would otherwise have occurred. Insofar as imports
of capital goods required complementary domestic resources to complete the
investment, the influx of imports was probably less depression-inducing than
would otherwise have been the case.
Some observers have suggested in interviews that an additional factor con-
tributing to the mildness of the first recession was the degree of wage and
price flexibility in Turkey in the late 1950's and early 1960's. That is a
difficult argument to assess. It is true that Turkish labor law at that time
forbade strikes. However, there are no reliable data on either employment or
wages with which to evaluate this argument. Of the 14 components of the
price index which are available on a quarterly basis for the l96l-to-1962
period, eleven declined at least once, and many more frequently during the
two-year interval,23 which would suggest considerable flexibility.
Causes of the 1960—1962 recession. It is far more difficult to evaluate the
factors contributing to the 1960—1962 recession than those for 1958—1959.
As shown above, the available evidence indicates that the 1960—1962
sion was substantially more severe and protracted than its earlier counterpart.
Yet as seen in Table IV-6 the simple model used to estimate aggregate excess
demand shows that there was more expansionary stimulus to the Turkish
economy in 1960 and 1961 than there had been in 1959.
Contemporary accounts attributed the recession to uncertainties following
the May 1960 Revolution. Hoarding on the part of the peasants was particu-
larly blamed for much of the difficulty:
The economy at the moment is inthedoldrums, and it looks as if the recovery will
be both slow and painful. The root of the present trouble seems to be that the
peasants are simply refraining from spending, with the result that business in the
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consumer goods sector has slackened off to such a degree that many of the big firms
are living off their capital and cannot meet their wage bills, while the smaller firms
are being forced to close down...24
The OECD view was similar:
The signs of a renewal of inflationary pressures and speculation, particularly after the
vote in February 1960 on the 1960-61 budget at a greatly increased level of expendi-
ture, were counteracted from the spring onwards by government policy to restrict the
growth of public expenditure and by the spread of sales resistance and currency
hoarding among the population, particularly the peasants. Consequently, demand for
consumer goods, such as textiles, declined during part of the year.. .Hoarding of
banknotes and, to a lesser extent, gold coins was a feature of 1960 and was the
counterpart of the reluctance of consumers, particularly peasants, to buy...25
The available evidence on this hypothesis is mixed, however. The ratio of
current GNP to the money supply, a crude indicator of the velocity of circu-
lation, declined from an average of 8.84 in 1950—1954 to 7.59 in 1955—1957,
rose to 8.85 in 1958 and 9.62 in 1959. Thereafter it fell to 9.27 in 1960 and
9.07 in 1961, rising to a peak of 10.16 in 1963. Then it gradually declined to
8.65 in 1969. One would expect a gradual decline in the income-money ratio
as the Turkish economy becomes increasingly monetized. However, the data
for the 1960-to-1962 period suggest a higher-than-average velocity of circula-
tion, the opposite of that implied by the hoarding hypothesis.
If one inspects real consumption behavior over the period, there is a sug-
gestion that consumption expenditures were somewhat below normal. If the
percentage of consumption in GNP as given by SPO (Table 1-1) is multiplied
by real GNP, the resulting estimates of real consumption for the years 1958
to 1962 are:
Year Consumption as a






While these estimates are necessarily crude, they suggest that real consump-
tion declined more than real income, which is consistent with the view that
the recession resulted from the response to the political changes.
As seen in Table IV-3, the increase in the money supply was very small
during 1960 and 1961. The behavior of the money supply undoubtedly con-
tributed to the length and severity of the second recession. Indeed, the phe-
24. EIU,op. cit. (Note 1, Chap. II), No. 37, February 1961, p. 2.
25. OECD, Turkey, 1961, op. cit. (Note 42, Chap. III), p. 14.to Stabilization: phases III and Iv
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nomenon from which it is tempting to draw conclusions is that the timing of
the first and second recessions coincided almost exactly with changes in the
rate of monetary expansion. The conclusion is highly plausible, and the be-
havior of the money supply was unquestionably important. What is not
known, however, is whether during the 1960—1962 period the money supply
remained stable as a matter of deliberate government policy or whether it
remained stable in the absence of increasing demand for credit.26
There is no doubt that the Revolutionary government was committed to
make the Stabilization Program work. Indeed, one of the reasons given for
the takeover was that the NUC government could better carry out the Stabili-
zation Program than had the Menderes government. The NUCsubstantially
pared the budget submitted by the Menderes government. Rapid expansion of
the money supply would not have been countenanced. Expectations based
upon the commitment of the new government may well have contributed to
recession. However, whether the actual behavior of the money supply was the
result of passive adaptation to demand or of deliberate government policy is
unknown.
The important question for present purposes is the degree to which the
two recessions were related to the Stabilization Program. The picture in
regard to the first recession is fairly clear: the abrupt shift in monetary policy
and other deflationary pressures emanating from the Stabilization Program
were the major factors in leading to it. That recession was very mild in
relation to the sharp reversal in monetary policy. The rapid expansion in
economic activity in the last part of 1959 and early 1960 is largely explained
by the government's abandonment of the major m netary and fiscal elements
of the program.
It is more difficult to say to what degree the second recession was linked
to the Stabilization Program. Once expansionist policies had been resumed in
1959—1960, the shift back to the Stabilization Program undoubtedly led to a
renewal of the recession. It is doubtful, however, whether the severity and
intensity of the recession can be laid solely at the door of the resumption of
the Stabilization Program. While the behavior of the money supply played a
key role in prolonging and intensifying the second recession, that behavior
may have been largely a passive response to money demand. Moreover, since
the government could have expanded the money supply somewhat without
imperiling price stability, part of the blame for the second recession must be
attributed to the failure of the money supply to expand.
We conclude therefore that insofar as Turkey had to pay a cost in the form
26. The OECD declared that the commercial banks were in general highly liquid and that
the demand for loans was "sluggish." OECD, Turkey, 1961, op. cit. (Note 42, Chap.
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of foregone output for the Stabilization Program, that cost lay primarily in
the lower-than-average rate of growth in 1959 and 1960. The decline in real
national income between 1960 and 1961 was neither necessary for the
achievement of price stability nor a result of the Stabilization Program.
Short-run resource-a/locational effects of the Stabilization Program. It
has already been seen that the behavior of export earnings immediately after
1958 was disappointing. The longer-run results were much more satisfactory
and are analyzed in Chapter VII. Here, focus is upon the short-run resource-
allocational effects of the Stabilization Program. In the absence of detailed
data, there are only three effects which deserve attention: (1) the composi-
tion of investment; (2) the behavior of construction; and (3) the productivity
of factors of production.
The sharpest shift observable from annual data was that in the composi-
tion of investment. Table IV-9 gives the data.2 7By1957 construction invest-
ment had increased to 76 per cent of total investment, with machinery and
equipment down to 24 per cent. By 1960 construction investment (which fell
in real terms) was 65 per cent of the total, while machinery and equipment
had increased to 35 per cent. Real machinery and equipment investment
increased fairly sharply. Imports of machinery and equipment virtually dou-
bled between 1958 and 1959.
Simultaneously, the import content of machinery and equipment invest-
ment rose sharply after the Stabilization Program, while that of construction
investment merely reattained its 1957 level. It was seen above that the ma-
chinery-and-equipment component of investment was hit much harder by
import shortages in the mid-19 SO's than was construction. One effect of the
Stabilization Program was to reverse the trend toward the increasing impor-
tance of construction investment.
The decline in relative importance of construction was, as just noted,
accompanied by an absolute drop in construction activity in real terms.
During the mid-1950's the increased share of construction had been accom-
panied by a drop in real machinery and equipment investment. A natural
interpretation of this reversal is that the earlier import stringency had led to a
non-optimal expansion in construction, which was counteracted with a re-
verse resource-allocational shift after the Stabilization Program. If there were
bottlenecks limiting production in other sectors in the mid-l950's, the con-
struction sector, relatively independent of imports, could have been the
market into which resources flowed. If so, the easing of bottlenecks would
have reversed the shift, thus leading to the downturn which actually occurred.
27. The data are not carried beyond 1960 because: (1) GUrtan's estimates terminate with
that date, and (2) the TL value of imports changed after 1960, so that the import
figures (in TL) are noncomparable. See, however, Table VHI-5, below.
There is no way of testin
deflators, calculated in the
cent increase in the price
compared with a 35 per ce
the increase in the relative
earlier years. To the extent
crease in the relative domes
suggest that liberalization a
tion.
The final resource-alloca
sources. On this subject lii
occur are obscured in the
Contemporary observers
been an important outcon
Development Bank of Turketo Stabilization. Phases IIIandjy
Im,that cost lay primarily in
rnd 1960. The decline in real
neither necessary for the
Stabilization Program.
Stabilization Program. It
rt earnings immediately after
were much more satisfactory
upon the short-run resource-
n. In the absence of detailed
attention: (1) the composi-
Lion; and (3) the productivity
ita was that in the composi-
1957 construction invest-
stment, with machinery and
iction investment (which fell
machinery and equipment
and equipment investment
ad equipment virtually dou-
Inery and equipment invest-
,while that of construction
vas seen above that the ma-
t was hit much harder by
truction. One effect of the
ward the increasing impor-
uction was, as just noted,
ion activity in real terms.
istruction had been accom-
investment. A natural
port stringency had led to a
counteracted with a re-
tion Program. If there were
the mid-1950's, the con-









Investment composition and import composition of investment, 1957 to 1960
111
1957 1958 1959 1960
A. (millions of TL, current prices)
Construction investment
Construction materials imports, c.i.f. 112 94 282 262
Domestic value of imports 324 261 528 505
Domestic materials 800 1289 [927 2043
Domestic value added 1800 2074 2159 2372
Total construction investment 2923 3624 4614 4921
Machinery and equipmentinvestment
Imports, c.i.f. 249 369 1061 1339
Domestic value of imports 628 894 1727 2115
Domestic goods 276 441 567 584
Total machinery and equipment 903 1335 2294 2699
Total Investment 3827 4960 6908 7620
B. (percentages)
Composition of total investment
Construction 76 73 67 65
Machinery andequipment 24 27 33 35
Imports (domestic value)to investmentin:
Construction 11 7 11 10
Machinery and equipment 70 67 75 78
Source:Same as Table 11-10.
There is no way of testing this hypothesis with available data. The implicit
deflators, calculated in the manner described in Table 11-i 1, indicate a 14 per
cent increase in the price of machinery and equipment from 1958 to 1960
compared with a 35 per cent increase in construction prices, thus reversing
the increase in the relative domestic price of machinery and equipment of
earlier years. To the extent that import liberalization accounted for the de-
crease in the relative domestic price of machinery and equipment, this would
suggest that liberalization accounted for the change in investment composi-
tion.
The final resource-allocational effect is that on the productivity of re-
sources. On this subject little evidence is available. Whatever changes did
occur are obscured in the available annual data by the effects of recession.
Contemporary observers however believed increased productivity to have
been an important outcome of the Stabilization Program. The Industrial
Development Bank of Turkey observed in its 1959 Annual Report:112 Responseto Stabilization: Phases Iii and IV The Devaluation Cum-Liberalizatj0
Before application of the stabilization policy the limits of the industrial production
of Turkey were determined by the existing industrial production capacity and espe-
cially by the possibility of supplying the need for raw materials, auxiliary materials
and spare parts. During the year under review, however, the deciding factors in
determining the volume of industrial production were especially the volume of
demand and the ability of the industrial and commercial community to finance
inventory formation...The fact that the sellers' market, which was evident before the
inflation turned into a buyers' market and especially the competition of imported
goods brought the question of quality improvement and lower cost of production to
the foreground.28
The OECD placed more emphasis upon the facts that "the serious underutili-
zation of productive capacity that had developed during the previous eighteen
months was thereby corrected," and that imports of spare parts and raw
materials enabled increases in output from existing capacity.29
All these resource-allocational effects undoubtedly emanated from the Sta-
bilization Program and the increased flow of imports. But it is impossible to
quantify even approximately the degree to which the productivity of re-
sources was thereby increased.
IV. The optimality of the Stabilization Program
Although the costs in the form of recession of the Stabilization Program
have been discussed above, the benefits in the form of an altered long-run
growth path have not been. It is nonetheless still possible at this stage to ask
the question: if Turkey was going to undergo such a program, could the
package have been improved upon?
Evaluation is difficult because there were three separate goals of the pro-
gram: (1) achieving internal price stability; (2) eliminating some undesirable
effects of government policies upon the domestic economy; and (3) altering
the nature of the foreign trade regime. Imposition of bank credit and govern-
ment budgetary ceilings and the raising of SEE prices were primarily aimed at
achievement of the first goal. Removal of the government's price control
regulations was designed to undo some of the damage inflicted by govern-
ment policy upon the domestic economy.3° Altered EERs, debt rescheduling
and the import liberalization financed primarily by foreign credits were in-
28. Annual Statement, Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, 1959, pp. 27—8.
29. OECD, Turkey. 1961, op. cit. (Note 42, Chap. III), p. 6.
30. Removal of the price control laws and price ceilings could have been undertaken at
any date independent of the Stabilization Program. While their removal was highly
desirable, it was not an integral part of the Stabilization Program, although failure to
remove them at that date would have resulted in continued domestic black markets
and other difficulties. They are therefore not considered further within this section.
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tended to affect the nature of the foreign trade regime. An additional compli-
cation to analysis of the optimality of the program is the fact that the
monetary-fiscal components of the Stabilization Program were abandoned in
1959 and resumed in 1960 along with other policy changes undertaken by
the NUC government.
An important question is whether the dual objectives of price stability and
an altered trade regime should have been sought in the same package. Ob-
siously, unless the rate of inflation had been substantially reduced, no long-
run alteration in the trade regime could have been anticipated on the basis of
a fixed exchange rate. Thus if price stability had not been sought, some form
of flexible exchange rate would have been the only means whereby lasting
changes in the trade regime could have been effected. Speculation about the
pros and cons of continued inflation, with a constant real EER, seems futile
because the political consensus in Turkey seems to have been that the evils of
inflation far outweighed its benefits. The price-stability goal of the program
seems to have been more important politically than trade-regime alterations.
However, even though price stability was achieved, by setting a fixed
exchange rate Turkey left herself vulnerable to renewed foreign-exchange
shortages and overvaluation, as indeed occurred in the 1960's. Although
inflation was mild contrasted with that in the 19 SO's, the adoption of a fixed
exchange rate precluded use of the exchange rate as a means of attaining
continuous external balance, It can be argued that the costs of such preclu-
sion might have been acceptably low had Turkey devalued again in the mid-
1960's. But the very fact of a fixed exchange rate created political pressures
making that difficult to do. Thus the effects of exchange-rate overvaluation in
the late 1960's can in a sense be blamed partly on the non-optimality of the
1958 Stabilization Program as it failed to include a mechanism for continued
exchange-rate adjustment.
Although such a mechanism would have been preferable, the Stabilization
Program did include a fixed exchange rate. To evaluate the program, there-
fore, the goals of price stability and an altered trade regime at a fixed-
exchange rate are accepted as the basis for evaluation for the remainder of
this section. We consider the optimality of each component of the package in
turn.
Little comment is required on the adjustment of SEE prices. Of course
SEE prices could have been increased without the remaining components of
the Stabilization Program, and one inflationary pressure in the situation
would have been reduced. However, given that SEE prices had not previously
been increased, a source of finance for the SEEs other than Central Bank
credits had to be found if inflation was to be reduced or eliminated at the
time the Stabilization Program was adopted. Given the situation of the SEEs
in August 1958, raising SEE prices was essential for the attainment of price
stability.
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The other anti-inflation components of the Stabilization Program, budget-
ary and credit ceilings, require slightly more evaluation. There can be no
doubt that the ceilings were stringent enough to bring inflation to a halt and
to that extent, were eminently successful. If the ceilings were nonoptimal, it
was in the other direction: the reversal of inflationary forces may have been
too strong. Not only did monetary expansion cease, but other factors were
deflationary: the doubling of import EERs led to a sizeable absorption of
purchasing power and the requirement that funds be deposited at the time of
import-license applications enhanced the effect. Thus with a constant money
supply the demand for money to finance imports shifted upward and the
volume of imports increased sharply without an off-setting increase in ex-
ports.
The best argument for the necessity of the zero-increase ceilings —which
implied constancy of the money supply —isthat any permitted rate of
expansion might have led the administration to evade the ceilings, or at least
to carry out whatever expansion was permitted at the earliest possible date.
Then too there is the consideration that some readjustment, accompanied by
recession, may have been essential after the near-runaway inflation of the
preceding years.
On the opposite side, some permitted expansion in the money supply
might have made the effects of the Stabilization Program less unpalatable to
the government. If that had happened the renewed inflationary impetus of
late 1959 might either have been smaller or nonexistent, thus rendering the
recession of 1960—l962 less prolonged and severe or even reversing it.3
Whether a smaller rate of increase in ceilings in 1958—1959 would have been
sufficient to induce the government to maintain the Stabilization Program is
integrally related to the question raised above as to the intentions of the
government when it accepted the Stabilization Program, and no definitive
answer is possible.
The Menderes government probably did not fully accept the goals of the
Stabilization Program. If that is so, zero-increase ceilings were probably neces-
sary if the Stabilization Program was to be imposed by foreign creditors and
to achieve price stability. However, had there been a government in Turkey
which fully accepted the goals of the program, it would probably have been
preferable to expand the money supply by1or 2 per cent per quarter
during the year after the adoption of the Stabilization Program. In view of
31. In view of the developments in 1960—1962, it is evident ex-post that monetary and
fiscal policy ought to have been more expansionist. But insofar as the reasons for
that recession lay in the downward shift in the consumption function and other
phenomena associated with the change in government, the problem was one of
general monetary-fiscal policy and did not have its origins in the Stabilization Pro-
gram.
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the deflationary effects of imports and their financing and the potential
growth rate of the Turkish economy (as well as its increasing monetization),
such an increase would still have represented a major shift from past mone-
tary behavior and enabled the cessation of inflation with a smaller impact on
the level of economic activity. That conclusion is highly debatable, however,
and other interpretations are equally valid.
Turning now to the components of the Stabilization Program aimed at
altering the trade regime, there can be little doubt about debt rescheduling. It
really was necessary years before it occurred. It is virtually impossible to
perform the mental experiment of rationalizing the trade regime in any way
in 1958 without debt rescheduling.
The desirability of the foreign credits received by Turkey is another matter
about which it would appear that conclusions can be reached. As seen above,
itis doubtful if the reversal of speculative capital flows exceeded $100 mil-
lion. Even though that response by itself would have enabled a temporary
increase in the volume of imports, the increase would have been relatively
minor in view of the level to which imports had fallen. Moreover, if import
liberalization was to be achieved, credits were probably necessary to provide
confidence that the liberalization could be continued for more than a very
short period.
In the economic conditions of 1958 the marginal product of additional
imports far exceeded the interest rate on foreign credits. Some of the credits,
especially in late 1959 and early 1960, were probably unwisely used when the
government renewed its expansionist policies, and under ideal management
the credits would not have been fully expended by mid-1960. However, the
large increase in imports which the credits permitted was important in several
ways: (1) it virtually wiped out the premia associated with import licenses;
(2) it was a significant factor in contributing to the deflationary pressure; and
(3) insofar as it enabled increased capacity utilization and other ways of
better utilizing existing resources, the direct productivity of the imports was
very high.
The final component of the program, alteration of EERs, raises two ques-
tions. (1) To what extent were the new EERs optimal? (2) Could the way
they were altered have been improved upon? The first question is the more
difficult. As seen above, the nominal devaluation was 220 per cent. But even
the effective devaluation (the change in the average PLD-EER) was 75 per
cent, which is large by any standard. Certainly a smaller effective devaluation
would have been less desirable: (1) as seen above, for many export commodi-
ties the new EER simply raised the lira equivalent of the international price
to the domestic price; (2) available evidence suggests that a change of smaller
magnitude would have left premia on import licenses for many commodities;
and (3) given that the exchange rate was to be fixed, some allowance had to1
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be made for the increase in the domestic price level that would follow the
raising of SEE prices and other adjustments.
A larger effective devaluation might have been more desirable. A maxi-
mum would have been about TL 12 =$L32We have seen that the actual
alteration in EERs did not substantially affect the degree of discrimination
against exports, asthe ratio of the import EER to the export EER in late The Anatomy
1959 was almost the same as in the pre-1958 years. Partly, however, that was
attributable to the implicit taxes on traditional exports and any larger effec-
tive devaluation would probably have necessitated higher export taxes on
some of those commodities. Given the responsiveness of non-traditional ex-
ports and minerals to increases in real export EERs (see Chapter VII below), a
somewhat greater devaluation could have increased the export response, per-
haps sizeably. On balance, the actual EER changes were probably on the
lower bound of the right order of magnitude, being sufficient to wipe out
premia but not enough to offset discrimination against exports.
The manner in which the exchange rates were altered is another question.
Exchange premia were altered so that the devaluation was de facto rather
than de jure, and if Turkey was committed to a fixed exchange rate, the
technique used to alter the rates led to a greater likelthood of one-sided
speculation about future EERs than de juTe devaluation would have. More-
over, while taxes on traditional agricultural exports are defensible on a variety
of grounds, their use was certainly unwarranted for minerals, and even for
other commodities their use led to speculative inventory withholding. Part of
the disappointing performance of exports in the first years after 1958 was the
result of the manner in which export EERs were changed.
The Stabilization Program must be judged on balance to have been a
successful one. Its objectives and achievements were in a sense negative, in
that the black markets, inflation, dislocations and import premia of the mid-
1950's were largely wiped out. Whether from the situation of 1958 it would
have been desirable to attempt more, i.e., to alter incentives drastically in
favor of exports, is a matter of judgment. But evaluated in terms of its own
goals, the Stabilization Program accomplished a great deal and the costs, in
terms of domestic recession, appear to have been held within reasonable
bounds.
32. This is the rate suggested by Okyar and hen in Columbia School of Law, op. cit.
(Note 14, Chap. I), p. 406.